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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiffs Animal Science Products, Inc. and Resco 
Products, Inc. appeal the District Court‟s dismissal of their 
First Amended Complaint, in part without prejudice, on the 
basis that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (the 
“FTAIA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6a.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will vacate and remand. 
 
I. 
 
The plaintiffs are domestic purchasers of “magnesite.”1  
The plaintiffs allege, on behalf of a putative class, that the 
defendants – Chinese producers and exporters of magnesite – 
engaged in a conspiracy since at least April 2000 to fix the 
price of magnesite that is exported to and sold in the United 
States.  The plaintiffs allege that this conspiracy has impacted 
hundreds of millions of dollars of United States commerce.  
Based on these allegations, the plaintiffs assert federal claims 
pursuant to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 16, predicated on 
the defendants‟ alleged violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.   
 
The plaintiffs first initiated this action by filing a 
complaint on September 7, 2005.  That complaint named 
seventeen Chinese business entities as defendants.  Only five 
                                              
1
  Magnesite is mined from magnesium deposits and used, 
among other things, to melt steel, make cement, and clean 
wastewater. 
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of those defendants are parties to this appeal, however, and 
these defendants are divided into two groups:  (1) the China 
Minmetals defendants and (2) the Sinosteel defendants.
2
  
After two years of litigation surrounding service of process 
issues, the plaintiffs moved for a default judgment on 
December 14, 2007.  The China Minmetals defendants and 
the Sinosteel defendants responded, and moved to compel 
arbitration of the dispute in China pursuant to arbitration 
clauses contained in several of the magnesite sales contracts.   
 
In an opinion dated December 30, 2008, the District 
Court dismissed all pending motions and dismissed the 
plaintiffs‟ complaint on the ground that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute pursuant to the 
FTAIA, a basis raised sua sponte by the District Court.  See 
Animal Science Prods., Inc. v. China  Nat‟l Metals & 
Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 596 F. Supp. 2d 842 (D.N.J. 
2008).
3
  The dismissal was without prejudice, and the District 
Court granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.  
The District Court instructed that   
 
in the event Plaintiffs file an amended 
complaint, Plaintiffs must incorporate in their 
                                              
2
  The China Minmetals defendants consist of China 
Minmetals Corporation and China National Minerals Co., 
Ltd.  The Sinosteel defendants consist of Sinosteel 
Corporation, Sinosteel Trading Company, and Liaoning Jiayi 
Metals & Minerals Co., Ltd.  Each group of defendants 
submitted its own brief on appeal.   
 
3
  In the alternative, the District Court held that the plaintiffs 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
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submission evidentiary proof allowing the 
[District] Court to conduct a factual 
determination (in contrast with the facial 
analysis conducted herein) and to conclusively 
satisfy itself as to presence or lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction over this action. 
 
Id. at 881 (emphasis in original).   
 
On March 30, 2009, the plaintiffs filed their First 
Amended Complaint and, as instructed, included evidentiary 
proof with their allegations.  The China Minmetals defendants 
and the Sinosteel defendants subsequently moved to dismiss 
on the basis that the District Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction or should otherwise abstain from resolving this 
dispute.  In a remarkably comprehensive opinion dated April 
1, 2010, the District Court engaged in extensive fact-finding 
and held that the FTAIA deprived it of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  See Animal Science Prods., Inc. v. China Nat‟l 
Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320 
(D.N.J. 2010).  The District Court thoroughly discussed the 
FTAIA‟s two exceptions but ultimately determined that the 
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that either exception was 
applicable to this case.  The District Court thus granted the 
defendants‟ motion and dismissed the plaintiffs‟ First 
Amended Complaint.
4
  Although the dismissal was partly 
                                              
4
  The District Court‟s April 1, 2010 opinion also:  (1) denied 
with prejudice the defendants‟ abstention defense under the 
act-of-state doctrine; (2) denied without prejudice the 
defendants‟ defense pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, with leave to renew at a later motion to 
dismiss; and (3) reserved a decision on the defendants‟ 
7 
 
without prejudice, the plaintiffs declined the District Court‟s 
invitation to amend their complaint for a second time and 
filed a timely notice of appeal.
5
   
 
II. 
 
This appeal involves interpreting the FTAIA, a statute 
that this Court has described as being “inelegantly phrased” 
and using “rather convoluted language.”  Turicentro, S.A. v. 
Am. Airlines Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(quotation marks omitted).  To wit, the FTAIA provides, in 
relevant part, that:      
      
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct 
involving trade or commerce (other than import 
trade or import commerce) with foreign nations 
unless – 
 
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, 
and reasonably foreseeable effect – 
 
(A) on trade or commerce which 
is not trade or commerce with 
foreign nations, or on import trade 
or import commerce with foreign 
nations; or 
 
                                                                                                     
abstention defense under the foreign sovereign compulsion 
doctrine. 
 
5
  We have appellate jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
8 
 
(B) on export trade or export 
commerce with foreign nations, of 
a person engaged in such trade or 
commerce in the United States; 
and 
 
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under 
the provisions of [the Sherman Act], 
other than this section. 
 
If [the Sherman Act] appl[ies] to such conduct 
only because of the operation of paragraph 
(1)(B), then [the Sherman Act] shall apply to 
such conduct only for injury to export business 
in the United States. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 6a. 
 
 Parsing this text reveals that the FTAIA first limits the 
reach of the U.S. antitrust laws by articulating a general rule 
that the Sherman Act “shall not apply to conduct involving 
trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations.”  The FTAIA 
then creates two distinct exceptions that restore the authority 
of the Sherman Act.  First, the FTAIA provides that it does 
not apply (and thus that the Sherman Act does apply) if the 
defendants were involved in “import trade or import 
commerce” (the “import trade or commerce” exception).  
Second, the FTAIA‟s bar is inapplicable if the defendants‟ 
“conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect” on domestic commerce, import commerce, or certain 
export commerce and that conduct “gives rise” to a Sherman 
Act claim (the “effects” exception).  See generally Turicentro, 
303 F.3d at 298-306 (discussing the FTAIA, the import trade 
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or commerce exception, and the effects exceptions); Carpet 
Group Int‟l v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass‟n, 227 F.3d 62, 71-
73 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing the FTAIA and the import trade 
or commerce exception). 
 
As noted above, the District Court construed the 
FTAIA as imposing a jurisdictional restriction, and, after 
engaging in fact-finding, determined that neither of the 
FTAIA‟s two exceptions applied.  For the reasons stated 
below, we hold that the FTAIA imposes a substantive merits 
limitation rather than a jurisdictional bar.  We will therefore 
vacate the District Court‟s opinion and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this holding.     
 
A. 
 
“Jurisdiction, it has been observed, is a word of many, 
too many, meanings.”  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Env‟t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting United States v. 
Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) (quotation 
marks omitted).  In recent years, the Supreme Court has been 
especially critical of courts‟ “profligate” and “less than 
meticulous” use of the term.  Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 
U.S. 500, 510, 511 (2006).  Thus, for example, in Kontrick v. 
Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 447 (2004), and Eberhart v. United 
States, 546 U.S. 12, 13 (2005) (per curiam), the Supreme 
Court clarified that time limitations set forth in the Federal 
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, respectively, were not jurisdictional in 
nature.  And more recently, in Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010), the Supreme Court 
overturned lower court precedent and held that the 
extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
10 
 
Act of 1934 presents a merits issue, rather than a question of 
subject matter jurisdiction.  
 
 Courts have been particularly “less than meticulous” in 
distinguishing between substantive merits and jurisdiction – 
that is, in differentiating between statutory elements that serve 
as a predicate to establishing a successful federal claim for 
relief on the merits, and statutory elements that define a 
federal court‟s adjudicative authority.  As a result, judicial 
opinions “„often obscure the issue by stating that the court is 
dismissing „for lack of jurisdiction‟ when some threshold fact 
has not been established, without explicitly considering 
whether the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction or for failure to state a claim.‟”  Arbaugh, 546 
U.S. at 511 (quoting Da Silva v. Kinsho Int‟l Corp., 229 F.3d 
358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000)).  The Supreme Court has “described 
such unrefined dispositions as „drive-by jurisdictional rulings‟ 
that should be accorded „no precedential effect‟ on the 
question whether the federal court had authority to adjudicate 
the claim in suit.”  Id. (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 91).  
 
 In order to clarify the difference between statutory 
elements that create a “jurisdictional” bar and those that 
create a “substantive merits” limitation, it is necessary to 
demarcate two sources of congressional authority:  the 
constitutional authority to set forth the elements of a 
successful claim for relief and the constitutional authority to 
delineate the subject matter jurisdiction of the lower courts.  
The former is sometimes referred to as Congress‟s 
“legislative jurisdiction,” while the latter has been labeled 
“judicial jurisdiction.”  Cf. Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing 
Ass‟n, 816 F.2d 895, 898 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that “it is 
important to distinguish elements of a claim that relate to 
11 
 
Congress‟s jurisdiction, i.e., its constitutional authority to act, 
from issues that relate to the jurisdiction of the courts”). 
 
In the antitrust context, Congress has the power to 
create and define the essential elements of a plaintiff‟s claim 
to antitrust relief pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, which bestows upon Congress the ability 
“[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Congress also 
possesses the authority, pursuant to Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution, to define the lower federal courts‟ jurisdiction to 
adjudicate disputes.  Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 
449 (1850).  Indeed, absent congressional action, the lower 
federal courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate any claims.  See 
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007) (“Within 
constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the 
federal courts have jurisdiction to consider.”).  Generally 
speaking, Congress has provided courts with jurisdiction to 
adjudicate antitrust claims through the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, which vests district courts with subject matter 
jurisdiction over cases “arising under” federal statutes, and 28 
U.S.C. § 1337(a), which provides district courts with 
jurisdiction over “any civil action or proceeding arising under 
any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade 
and commerce against restraints and monopolies.”   
 
The threshold question presented by this appeal 
requires us to distinguish between these two sources of 
congressional authority.  Specifically, we must determine 
whether, in enacting the FTAIA, Congress legislated pursuant 
to its Commerce Clause authority to articulate substantive 
elements that a plaintiff must satisfy to assert a meritorious 
claim for antitrust relief or whether Congress acted pursuant 
12 
 
to its Article III powers to define the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.  In Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 300-02, and Carpet 
Group, 227 F.3d at 69-73, this Court presumed that the latter 
interpretation was correct, and thus analyzed the FTAIA as if 
it imposed a jurisdictional limitation on a court‟s ability to 
hear Sherman Act claims.  Understandably, the District Court 
in this case adhered to this precedent.  In light of the Supreme 
Court‟s subsequent decision in Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 500, and 
other recent cases, however, we will now overturn this aspect 
of our Turicentro and Carpet Group decisions and hold that 
the FTAIA constitutes a substantive merits limitation rather 
than a jurisdictional limitation.
6
   
 
In Arbaugh, the Supreme Court articulated a “readily 
administrable bright line,” “clearly states” rule to determine 
                                              
6
  “While a panel of our Court is bound by the precedential 
decisions of earlier panels, that rule does not apply „when the 
prior decisions conflict with a Supreme Court decision.‟”  
Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 
2009)) (alterations omitted); see also United States v. 
Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2001).  It is worth 
noting that this is not the first time that we have overruled an 
earlier decision‟s characterization of a statutory limitation as 
being “jurisdictional” in light of the Supreme Court‟s 
Arbaugh decision.  See Pittsburgh Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. 
Int‟l Union of Operating Eng‟rs, Local Union No. 66, 580 
F.3d 185, 189-90 (3d Cir. 2009) (overruling earlier Third 
Circuit precedent and holding “that the existence of a union 
contract is not a jurisdictional requirement under section 301” 
of the Labor Management Relations Act).   
13 
 
whether a statutory limitation sets forth a jurisdictional 
requirement or a substantive merits element:   
 
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold 
limitation on a statute‟s scope shall count as 
jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be 
duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle 
with the issue.  But when Congress does not 
rank a statutory limitation on coverage as 
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction 
as nonjurisdictional in character. 
 
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16 (footnote and citation omitted).  
Arbaugh concerned Title VII‟s “employee-numerosity 
requirement” – the restriction that Title VII only applies if an 
employer has fifteen or more employees.  The Supreme 
Court, applying the “clearly states” rule just articulated, noted 
that the “employee-numerosity requirement” appears in a 
provision of Title VII that “does not speak in jurisdictional 
terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district 
courts” and thus unanimously determined that “the threshold 
number of employees for application of Title VII is an 
element of a plaintiff's claim for relief, not a jurisdictional 
issue.”  Id. at 515, 516 (quotation marks omitted); see also 
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1244-47 
(2010) (applying Arbaugh‟s “clearly states” rule to determine 
that the Copyright Act‟s registration requirement is not 
jurisdictional).  
 
 A review of the FTAIA‟s statutory text compels the 
same conclusion in this case. The FTAIA neither speaks in 
jurisdictional terms nor refers in any way to the jurisdiction of 
the district courts.  Cf. Boyd v. AWB Ltd., 544 F. Supp. 2d 
14 
 
236, 243 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (remarking that “nothing in the 
statutory language of the FTAIA indicates that its limitations 
are jurisdictional”).  Indeed, the statutory text is wholly silent 
in regard to the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
7
  The 
FTAIA reads only that the Sherman Act “shall not apply” if 
certain conditions are met.  Assessed through the lens of 
Arbaugh‟s “clearly states” test, the FTAIA‟s language must 
be interpreted as imposing a substantive merits limitation 
rather than a jurisdictional bar.  Or, in the terminology set 
forth above, in enacting the FTAIA, Congress exercised its 
Commerce Clause authority to delineate the elements of a 
successful antitrust claim rather than its Article III authority 
to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts.  We therefore 
overrule our earlier precedent that construed the FTAIA as 
imposing a jurisdictional limitation on the application of the 
Sherman Act.
8
 
                                              
7
  Admittedly, the additional limitations imposed by the 
FTAIA may function to define the outer reach of 
congressional power over foreign behavior by requiring a 
nexus between the alleged anticompetitive behavior and the 
United States.  In this regard, however, we agree with Justice 
Scalia that “the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act . . . 
has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the courts.  It is a 
question of substantive law turning on whether, in enacting 
the Sherman Act, Congress asserted regulatory power over 
the challenged conduct.”  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 
509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).    
 
8
  In reaching this conclusion, we disagree with the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit‟s decision in United 
Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., 322 F.3d 942 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (en banc), which deemed the FTAIA‟s limitations 
15 
 
                                                                                                     
to be jurisdictional in nature.  United Phosphorus, however, 
was decided before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Arbaugh.  Indeed, the holding in Arbaugh largely mirrors the 
reasoning of Judge Diane Wood‟s dissent in that case.  She 
argued that there was no “hint that the Congress was 
attempting to strip federal courts of their” jurisdiction in the 
FTAIA, and that “[l]anguage like that of the FTAIA, stating 
that a law does not „apply‟ in certain circumstances, cannot be 
equated to language stating that the courts do not have 
fundamental competence to consider defined categories of 
cases.”  Id. at 954, 955 (Wood, J., dissenting).  For the 
reasons stated in the text, we concur with Judge Wood‟s 
analysis.    
We also agree with Judge Wood‟s conclusion that “a 
review of the history of the application of the antitrust laws to 
persons and conduct beyond the borders of the United States 
also leads to [this] result.”  Id. at 959.  For this reason, the 
Supreme Court‟s opinion in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 
(2007), is distinguishable.  The Supreme Court in Bowles 
determined that 28 U.S.C. § 2107, which requires parties in a 
civil action to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the 
judgment being appealed, was jurisdictional in nature 
notwithstanding the absence of text that clearly labeled the 
statutory limitation as such.  In Reed Elsevier, the Supreme 
Court clarified that “Bowles stands for the proposition that 
context, including this Court's interpretation of similar 
provisions in many years past, is relevant to whether a statute 
ranks a requirement as jurisdictional.”  Reed Elsevier, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1247-48.  Judge Wood‟s analysis in United Phosphorus 
suggests that the relevant context here supports the 
interpretation compelled by the statutory text:  the FTAIA‟s 
limitations should not rank as jurisdictional.   
16 
 
B. 
 
On remand, the District Court may entertain renewed 
motions to dismiss pursuant to the FTAIA‟s statutory 
limitations.  For the reasons just stated, however, those 
motions must be decided pursuant to the procedural 
framework that governs a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rather than a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
9
  Of 
course the District Court is under no obligation to resolve the 
                                                                                                     
 
9
  We catalogue just two of the significant differences 
between these two motions and how they may apply on 
remand in this case:  First, the burden in a Rule 12(b)(1) 
motion rests with the plaintiff, who must establish that there 
is subject matter jurisdiction; by contrast, the defendant 
carries the burden in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  Accordingly, 
the burden on remand would no longer rest with the plaintiffs, 
but with the defendants.  Second, while a court generally 
looks only to the face of the plaintiff‟s complaint, must accept 
all alleged facts to be true, and is not permitted to make 
independent findings of fact when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, a court may examine evidence and resolve factual 
disputes on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.  Cf. Growth Horizons, 
Inc. v. Del. Cnty., Pa., 983 F.2d 1277, 1281 n.4 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(noting that “it is true that a court can find facts under Rule 
12(b)(1) but not under Rule 12(b)(6)”).  It would therefore be 
inappropriate for the District Court, on remand, to assess 
independently the credibility of allegations asserted by 
plaintiff‟s expert witness.   
 
17 
 
FTAIA issue.  Unmoored from the question of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the FTAIA becomes just one additional merits 
issue.  In that regard, we note that while the District Court 
must still ascertain the propriety of exercising subject matter 
jurisdiction over this dispute, the District Court may exercise 
its discretion ultimately to resolve this matter through other 
means, for example, by deciding the defendants‟ original 
motions to compel arbitration.  In light of the tremendous 
effort put forth by the District Court on the FTAIA issue, 
however, and for the sake of efficiency, we offer two brief 
instructions if the District Court addresses the FTAIA 
question again on remand. 
 
First, the District Court correctly discerned that the 
import trade or commerce exception “must be given a 
relatively strict construction.”  Carpet Group, 227 F.3d at 72.  
The District Court erred, however, in holding that this “strict 
construction” requires that the defendants function as the 
physical importers of goods.  See Animal Science, 702 F. 
Supp. 2d at 369 n.52 (“Simply put, the FTAIA is wholly 
inapplicable to Plaintiffs‟ claims if  – and only if – 
Defendants were, in fact, im porters.” (emphasis in original)).  
Functioning as a physical importer may satisfy the import 
trade or commerce exception, but it is not a necessary 
prerequisite.
10
  Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the 
defendants‟ alleged anticompetitive behavior “was directed at 
an import market.”  Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 303 (quoting 
Kruman v. Christie‟s Int‟l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 395 (2d Cir. 
                                              
10
  Indeed, we implied as much when we held in Turicentro 
that the defendants in that case “cannot be labeled 
„importers.‟  Nor have they engaged in “import trade or 
commerce.”  Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 303 (emphasis added).   
18 
 
2002)) (quotation marks omitted).  Or, to phrase it slightly 
differently, the import trade or commerce exception requires 
that the defendants‟ conduct target import goods or services.   
 
We held that this requirement was not satisfied in 
Turicentro.  Turicentro involved a group of foreign travel 
agents who sued various U.S. airline companies, alleging that 
they conspired to fix commission rates paid to foreign travel 
agents.  Based on these facts, we reasoned that:  
 
The alleged conspiracy in this case was directed 
at commission rates paid to foreign travel 
agents based outside the United States.  That 
some of the services plaintiffs offered were 
purchased by United States customers is not 
dispositive under this inquiry.  Defendants were 
allegedly involved only in unlawfully setting 
extra-territorial commission rates.  Their actions 
did not directly increase or reduce imports into 
the United States. 
 
Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 303.  The conspiracy in Turicentro 
thus targeted a foreign market:  fixing commission rates paid 
to foreign travel agents.  Any subsequent “importing” of these 
rates into the United States occurred as a result of the 
plaintiffs‟ own activities, as it was the plaintiff travel agents 
(and not the defendant airline companies) who sold services 
with allegedly fixed rates to U.S. customers.   
  
By contrast, we held that the import trade or commerce 
exception did apply in Carpet Group, deeming it sufficient 
that the plaintiffs “charge[d] that defendants engaged in a 
course of activity designed to ensure that only United States 
19 
 
importers, and not United States retailers, could bring oriental 
rugs manufactured abroad into the stream of American 
commerce.”  Carpet Group, 227 F.3d at 72.  In that case, the 
defendants‟ conduct targeted the U.S. import market in 
various ways:  
 
[The] defendants took steps to:  (1) prevent 
foreign manufacturers from selling to United 
States retailers, (2) prevent at least one 
American retailer from purchasing rugs directly 
from foreign manufacturers, (3) prevent foreign 
governments and trade associations from 
sponsoring trade fairs at which retailers could 
purchase directly from foreign manufacturers, 
and (4) prevent an American rug retailers‟ trade 
association from sponsoring the trade fairs. 
 
Id. at 73.   
 
On remand, therefore, if the District Court addresses 
the applicability of the import trade or commerce exception, 
the District Court should assess whether the plaintiffs 
adequately allege that the defendants‟ conduct is directed at a 
U.S. import market and not solely whether the defendants 
physically imported goods into the United States.
11
 
                                              
11
  We note further that the District Court held that, in an 
antitrust case involving the shipment of goods into the United 
States from abroad, the port of first destination of goods sold 
by a seller located abroad to a domestic buyer is not 
determinative of whether the defendant was an “importer.”  
See Animal Science, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 372.  This opinion 
has made clear that the import exception is not limited to 
20 
 
 Second, the FTAIA‟s effects exception does not 
contain a “subjective intent” requirement.  The plaintiffs 
noted that certain language utilized by the District Court 
appeared to require that the plaintiffs demonstrate that the 
defendants subjectively intended to impact U.S. commerce.  
See Animal Science, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (interpreting 
“substantial” to mean whether the “defendants‟ conduct was 
actually „intended/consciously meant‟[] to produce a 
consequence in the United States”); id. at 349 (using the 
phrase “intent-to-affect”).  It is not apparent whether the 
District Court‟s conclusions relied on these passing 
references.  In any event, we clarify that the FTAIA‟s 
“reasonably foreseeable” language imposes an objective 
standard:  the requisite “direct” and “substantial” effect must 
have been “foreseeable” to an objectively reasonable person.  
The text of the statute – “reasonably foreseeable” – makes 
plain that an objective standard applies.
12
  Accordingly, if the 
                                                                                                     
importers, but also applies if the defendants‟ conduct is 
directed at an import market.  Because we consider the 
delivery location of goods sold by a foreign seller to be 
relevant to whether that seller‟s actions were directed at a 
United States import market, rather than some foreign market, 
the District Court should, if it considers the import exception 
on remand, give weight to any well-pled allegations that the 
defendants in this action made direct sales of magnesite for 
delivery in the United States during the time period of the 
alleged conspiracy.   
 
12
  The District Court‟s “intent-to-affect” test led it to adopt a 
second holding:  that the plaintiffs must show that U.S. 
purchasers were uniquely charged higher prices.  See Animal 
Science, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 349 (suggesting that plaintiffs 
21 
 
District Court assesses the FTAIA‟s effects exception on 
remand, the relevant inquiry is whether the alleged domestic 
effect would have been evident to a reasonable person making 
practical business judgments.   
 
III. 
 
 For the reasons stated above, we will vacate and 
remand.   
 
                                                                                                     
“cannot show an „intent-to-affect‟ even by the entire Chinese 
magnesite industry unless [they] provide facts showing that 
Chinese domestic purchases and all foreign non-American 
purchasers were charged lower prices”).  At the motion to 
dismiss stage, however, the effects test may be satisfied by 
allegations that the domestic injury is direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable, without regard to whether United 
States consumers are alone in suffering that injury.  See F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 
159 (2004) (“[T]his case involves vitamin sellers around the 
world that agreed to fix prices, leading to higher vitamin 
prices in the United States and independently leading to 
higher vitamin prices in other countries such as Ecuador.  We 
conclude that, in this scenario, a purchaser in the United 
States could bring a Sherman Act claim under the FTAIA 
based on domestic injury.”).   
